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THE ROLE OF EXISTING ENVIRONMENTAL
LAWS IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE MOVEMENT
MICHAEL B. GERRARD*
I will focus on what can and cannot be done under the existing
statutory and regulatory structures and the common law to pro-
tect minority communities from environmental hazards. I will
highlight some of the current holes in the legal system to suggest
areas where statutory reform might be useful. Fights against
these facilities break down between future unbuilt facilities, on
the one hand, and existing facilities on the other hand.
A broad array of statutes regulates future facilities, such as
landfills, incinerators, interstate highways, and polluting facto-
ries. Some of these laws are aimed at providing information and
requiring the decisionmakers to think about environmental is-
sues. The most prominent of these is, of course the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act ("NEPA").' Here in New York, we have its
analog, the State Environmental Quality Review Act ("SEQRA"). 2
Under these statutes some consideration is given to social and
economic factors. However, these are not substantive statutes.
They do not compel any particular results, only consideration.
The new Presidential Executive Order on Environmental Jus-
tice3 is in this tradition of compelling consideration but without
* Partner, Berle, Kass & Case, 1978-1994; adjunct professor, Columbia University Law
School. He is author of Whose Backyard, Whose Risk: Fear and Fairness in Toxic and Nu-
clear Waste Siting (MIT Press 1994) and General Editor of the six-volume Environmental
Law Practice Guide, which was named the best law book of 1992 by the Association of
American Publishers. He coauthors the monthly environmental law column in The New
York Law Journal, and edits a monthly newsletter, Environmental Law in New York. He is
coauthor of a treatise, Environmental Impact Review in New York (Matthew Bender 1990,
updated annually). He is Vice Chairman of the Environmental Law Section of the New
York State Bar Association. In November 1994, after the Symposium, he became a partner
in the New York office of Arnold & Porter.
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1988) (declaring national policy to encourage harmony be-
tween man and environment, establishing Council on Environmental Quality, and requir-
ing the preparation of environmental impact statements).
2 N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERv. LAw §§ 8-0101 to 8-0117 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1994).
3 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994).
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mandating an outcome. These kinds of laws provide ammunition
but no trigger. They often furnish information that is very useful
in fighting a project but they themselves seldom provide the ac-
tual legal basis for reaching a particular conclusion.
A number of statutes protect particular kinds of resources. At
the federal level, these include the Clean Air Act;4 the Clean
Water Act,' in particular, the very important Section 404 Program
under the Clean Water Act aimed at protecting wetlands; the En-
dangered Species Act;' section 4(f) of the Department of Transpor-
tation Act, which makes it difficult to build a highway or an air-
port in an historic area; the Superfund Law, the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CER-
CLA7); v and a number of others.
There are, additionally, state and local analogs to most of these
federal laws. Most of these statutes were enacted in the early
1970's, in what can be seen, in retrospect, as the golden age of
environmental statutory development, oddly enough, under the
Nixon and Ford administrations. These laws tend to say that one
cannot site, or can site only with great difficulty, a facility in a
wetland or in a navigable waterway or in the habitat of an endan-
gered species or in some other area that enjoys the particular pro-
tections of these statutes.
However, there is no overall "People Protection Act." There is
no statute that says one cannot build a landfill or an incinerator
near where numerous people live. Instead, the protection for peo-
ple is implicit in such statutes as the portion of the Clean Air Act
that prohibits exceeding emissions standards that are designed to
protect human health.
In order to persuade a court or an administrative body that a
proposed facility will be unhealthy, a facility opponent must gen-
erally establish that there will be exposure and that a significant
4 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994) (creating scheme to protect and enhance
quality of nation's air resources).
5 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988) (declaring objec-
tive to restore and maintain chemical, physical, and biological integrity of nation's waters,
and establishing regulatory program).
6 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988) (providing means whereby ecosystems upon which en-
dangered species thrive may be preserved).
7 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The "Superfund" establishes a means of pay-
ment for cleanups resulting from various violations. Id. § 9611; see also I.R.C. § 9507




risk will flow from that exposure. In order to do that, the basic
information is generally in the permit application and environ-
mental impact statement, which are typically prepared by the pro-
ject applicant. It should come as no great surprise that relatively
few project applications will say that the incinerator they are pro-
posing, for example, will cause multiple cases of cancer or respira-
tory disease. Therefore, protection of health under these statutes
is indirect and often difficult.
As a result of this disparity in the way the statutes are written,
it is easier legally to put a hazardous facility, such as an incinera-
tor in the middle of a city, than to put it in a remote wetland or in
the habitat of an endangered species. That is not to say it is easier
politically, but it is certainly easier legally.
Several statutes regulate particular kinds of facilities or activi-
ties. Very prominent is the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act ("RCRA"),8 which in one subtitle regulates hazardous waste
facilities and in another subtitle regulates ordinary solid waste fa-
cilities. Many other complicated command and control statutes
govern other kinds of activities: the Hazardous Materials Trans-
portation Act;9 the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenti-
cide Act;' 0 the Oil Pollution Act,"' which has many provisions for
oil tankers, and so on.
These are very rigorous command and control requirements, but
they tend to have relatively little to do with siting issues. Using
the array of statutes, the information statutes, the resource-based
statutes, and the facility-oriented statutes, it is often very possible
to kill, or at least to delay severely, waste disposal or industrial
projects. This is particularly so for waste disposal projects, espe-
cially if the opponents are well organized, well financed and have
the support of their local government.
8 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6907 (1988) (providing
performance guidelines for various solid waste management practices in order to protect
public health).
9 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1819 (1988 & Supp. II 1990) (declaring congressional policy of grant-
ing regulatory authority to Secretary of Transportation in order to protect against risks
inherent in shipping hazardous materials).
10 See The Pesticide Control Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1988) (providing definitions and giving
guidelines for use of pesticides).
11 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified as amended at
33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (Supp. IV 1993)) (stating intent to reduce oil spills and to force
cleanup by parties responsible).
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I have been practicing environmental law since 1978 and have
frequently represented community organizations and municipali-
ties fighting waste disposal projects. Of those kinds of projects, I
think we have won ten, lost one and we have about a half a dozen
that are still ongoing. That is an indication that there really are
meaningful legal remedies available to people who want to block
incinerators, landfills, and that sort of thing. But to do that re-
quires an organized community with sufficient resources, and
preferably one which has the support of its local municipal
government.
One particular difficulty that often arises is that a community
only learns very late that a project proposal is pending. A good
example of that in this region is the medical waste incinerator at
the Bronx Lebanon Hospital, where most members of the commu-
nity did not learn of the proposal until after the permits had been
granted, and they thus lost most of the meaningful opportunities
to participate.
This very high success rate applies particularly to waste dispo-
sal projects where the statutes have established a near-zero dis-
charge standard. There is very little legal tolerance for water or
air emissions from these facilities. These facilities are also not
very labor intensive. They do not create many jobs. They often do
not have very much political support. Polluting industries tend to
be a somewhat different story. There is greater tolerance for air
and water emissions from industrial operations. They tend to cre-
ate more jobs, have greater positive economic impacts, and are
somewhat harder to fight. They also do not have the same psycho-
logical association as do waste disposal facilities.
The high success rate for opponents applies not at all to people
who are fighting social service facilities and low income housing
projects. Those tend to be projects that are not the subject of
many of the facility-specific construction laws. They tend not to
have much of an environmental impact unless they happen to be
sited in a wetland or a similar environmentally-sensitive area. I
believe that this disparity is one positive aspect of the legal sys-
tem, because I think that fighting waste disposal facilities is often
a socially useful thing, while fighting low income housing and so-
cial service facilities is destructive. But that is a different topic.
There are also liability-imposing laws. The most prominent of
those is CERCLA, which essentially states that anybody who gen-
[Vol. 9:555
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT
erated, transported, stored, or disposed of hazardous waste can be
potentially liable for cleaning it up. CERCLA has had a very posi-
tive impact in so frightening people that they greatly reduce their
creation of hazardous waste. As a result, hazardous waste gener-
ation rates in this country are way down over the last three or four
years. As a direct result of that phenomenon, many of the pro-
posed hazardous waste disposal facility projects have been aban-
doned in recent years. These laws can also be very helpful in
fighting proposed projects if the proposed site is itself already con-
taminated with hazardous waste.
Where the communities are able to participate in the legal pro-
cess to fight facilities, often they are required to focus on objec-
tions that are peripheral to their substantive concerns. If the only
tool that you have is a hammer, then the only things you can deal
with are nails. If the only laws that you have are laws that say
you cannot site facilities in endangered species' habitats or in wet-
lands, then that is what you look for.
A classic example of that is opposition to the Westway Highway
in Manhattan. 2 The opponents, including myself, originally
fought the highway on air pollution and traffic grounds. We ulti-
mately lost on those grounds and began looking around for some-
thing else. Someone suggested that there might actually be fish in
the part of the Hudson River where they wanted to build a landfill
with the highway running through it. It seemed like a counterin-
tuitive proposition. Fish in the lower Hudson River? It turned out
that they really were there in abundance. That was the basis for
the ultimate defeat of Westway-the amazing discovery of the
habitat for striped bass.
There have been efforts to more directly address the concerns of
communities in fighting projects, but those have enjoyed far less
success, as you have heard discussed today. There have been a
number of attempts to utilize the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution to fight projects.
Those lawsuits under Equal Protection, under section 1983,11
and under various other civil rights laws, have been so far uni-
formly unsuccessful. Every one of those that has gone to decision
12 See Sierra Club v. Hennessy, 695 F.2d 643, 644 (2d Cir. 1982) (concerning proposed
highway replacement program which contemplated creating landfill).
13 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (recognizing cause of action for governmental violation of civil
rights).
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has lost overwhelmingly. The courts have found that disparate
impact is not enough; one must also prove racially discriminatory
intent, and no one has been able to prove such intent in one of
these cases.14 If someone were to find in a filing cabinet a memo to
the mayor from the planning commissioner saying, "Let's put this
landfill in this neighborhood because there are only a bunch of
blacks living there, and we do not care about that," that would be
a terrific predicate for such a lawsuit, but such a smoking memo
has not emerged in any of these cases, and so far the cases have
been unsuccessful.
The bringing of this litigation is often important politically. It
often mobilizes the community. It highlights the political struc-
ture and the nature of what people are trying to do. It brings out a
lot of the useful information. But these are not the sorts of cases
that are going to lead to a high success rate in stopping particular
projects.
The New York City Fair Share Law 15 has some promise of de-
veloping into something useful. The common law has not been at
all helpful in fighting future projects. People have tried to con-
struct notions of anticipatory nuisance, but those do not get any-
where, especially since in these cases there is usually a finding by
an expert regulatory agency that the project will be safe, and so
the courts are not about to say, "No, EPA is wrong; I, a judge,
think that this is going to be lousy and you cannot build it because
it will someday be a nuisance."
So far I have been speaking about future facilities. Let me now
turn briefly to existing facilities, which often pose real hazards.
The situation here is almost the inverse of what it is for future
projects. For future facilities the statutes are very helpful, but the
common law usually is not. For existing facilities the statutes
have not been very helpful, but the common law has been. A ma-
jor reason why the statutes are not especially helpful in protecting
communities from the dangers caused by existing facilities that
are harming them today is an element that is pervasive through-
14 See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 584 (1983);
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 20 (1979); Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978).
15 Criteria for the Location of City Facilities, New York, N.Y., Rules of the City of New
York, ch. 62, app. A (1991) (proposing to improve neighborhood stability by enforcing fair
distribution of city facilities).
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out the environmental regulatory structure and system of land
use law. That is the concept of grandfathering.
We all know that the word grandfathering arose from the old
laws in the deep south that unless your grandfather voted, you
could not either. Those laws had a discriminatory intent as well
as effect, and were ruled unconstitutional. Today the grandfather
law says that if a facility already has a permit, it can keep it. It
essentially says that once a facility is up and running, it has a
vested property right in its continued existence, and it takes a
great deal to dislodge those rights. It is extraordinarily difficult to
shut down an existing facility. A major example of that in New
York is in Williamsburg, Brooklyn, where there is a hazardous
and radioactive waste storage facility known as Radiac.
16
It is inconceivable that one could today site a radioactive and
hazardous waste storage facility in Brooklyn, yet this facility has
been operating for about fifteen or twenty years. When the oppo-
nents tried to shut it down a few years ago, the court said: "No,
grandfathered, go away. Keep on operating." It now appears that
beginning in July of 1994, when New York State loses its access to
the Barnwell radioactive waste disposal facility in South Carolina,
an even larger volume of radioactive waste is going to Brooklyn,
because this Brooklyn facility is grandfathered. Many of the im-
portant federal laws have grandfathering provisions. Most promi-
nent is the interim status provision of RCRA, 17 but there are
many others.
There are some opportunities, if not to shut down, at least to
help influence some existing facilities. To cite one example under
the Clean Water Act, facilities with pollution discharge permits
must file monthly discharge monitoring reports, and if those re-
ports reveal that a facility is emitting pollution in excess of what
the permit allows, one can go into court with a citizen's suit and
seek imposition of significant monetary penalties. When the time
comes for renewal of the permit, a request for an expansion or a
significant modification of the permit will sometimes provide an
opportunity to raise issues.
16 See Hameline v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conserv., 175 A.D.2d 206, 206, 572
N.Y.S.2d 347, 347 (2d Dep't 1991).
17 42 U.S.C. § 6907 (1988).
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Permits also very often incorporate, by reference, the operating
and maintenance manuals and other obscure documents that ap-
ply to a facility. If someone can establish a violation of those re-
quirements, that might also be the subject of a citizen's suit.
Under RCRA, corrective action is required-cleanup of existing
contamination for lawful hazardous waste disposal facilities.
Water pollution control facility construction grants sometimes
have conditions attached that can be helpful. Additionally, the
Emergency Planning Community Right to Know Act'" requires
the disclosure of a great deal of public information about the emis-
sions from a facility, and these can be useful politically in trying to
fight the facility.
As I said, even though the statutes are of limited use in fighting
existing facilities, the common law often does provide a meaning-
ful remedy because one does not have to argue an anticipatory
nuisance. There is sometimes a genuine current nuisance, and
common law remedies and other related doctrines, such as tres-
pass, sometimes do provide remedies. In some states, including
New York, the courts have backed off from the prior common law
rule that if there was a nuisance, the facility automatically had to
shut down. In the case of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement, 9 decided by
the New York Court of Appeals about twenty-five years ago, the
court refused to shut an existing cement plant, because the plant
was socially useful. There should be monetary damages awarded
to the neighbors, but they were not going to shut down the facility.
There is a balancing of the equities; the social utility of the facility
is balanced against the damage that it causes.
One of the great difficulties is trying to compel the cleanup of
existing contaminated sites. Regardless of the debate on whether
current siting of facilities creates disproportionate impacts, there
is relatively little debate that old contaminated sites, such as
Superfund sites, are disproportionately located in low income and
minority communities. But under the federal law aimed at ad-
dressing this issue, the Superfund Law, it takes an average of
fourteen years between the time when a facility is first discovered
and the time that it is finally cleaned up-a very long time. It
18 42 U.S.C. § 11,023 (1988) (mandating completion of Toxic Chemical Release Form
whenever certain chemicals are manufactured beyond minimum threshold).
19 Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., Inc., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312
(1970) (evaluating utility of plant with regard to nuisance created).
[Vol. 9:555
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT
largely is a result of what I like to call the paralysis of sequential
indecision. In this process, a whole series of decisions have to be
made concerning whether the site is contaminated enough to
worry about and then how to clean it up. At each stage, there is
much difficulty in making the decision, so the whole process can go
on almost limitlessly.
Let me conclude by suggesting a couple of areas where I think
statutory reform would be useful. For the kinds of projects that
are most likely to have adverse health effects, such as incinerators
and landfills, I think that when making siting decisions, the prox-
imity to a densely populated area should be elevated to equal sig-
nificance to the presence of a wetland or an endangered species
habitat or some other protected natural area. It is important to
protect wetlands and habitat, but it should be at least equally im-
portant to protect people.
In doing risk assessments, there should be a required assump-
tion that pollution control equipment will malfunction and that
enforcement will be weak. I think those assumptions will more
closely reflect reality and give a better taste of what the actual
impacts of the facility are likely to be. Assistance should be pro-
vided to minority and low income communities to allow them to
participate, so that they can be equal players in the siting process.
Waste prevention laws should be enacted so that there will be less
demand for waste disposal facilities in the first place. The grand-
father provisions should be weakened to the extent that is consti-
tutionally permissible.
Finally, with regard to the cleanup of hazardous waste sites,
there should be less control of the process by the potentially re-
sponsible parties and more control and more direct action by the
government. It is a travesty that throughout the country there
are thousands of identified hazardous waste sites which continue
to leak and emit air and water pollution because of bureaucratic
paralysis and that are known to pose a significant threat to health
and the environment and are disproportionately located in the mi-
nority and low income communities.
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